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NOTES
EscoBEDo IN NEw YORK
Prior Law and Escobedo
The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 1 In Crooker v. Cal-
ifornia,2 the landmark case interpreting this right, the defendant
requested and was denied an opportunity to call a lawyer while
he was in police custody. After detention for fourteen hours, he
confessed to murder. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's
rights were not violated and that his confession was therefore
admissible. The denial of counsel in Crooker was considered only
one of many relevant factors in the determination of whether the
defendant's confession was involuntary.3  Thus, the Court re-
affirmed a "totality of circumstances" test, which requires the
exclusion of a confession only where all the circumstances indicate
that the defendant has been denied "fundamental fairness." 4
Consequently, the denial of a request for counsel was not, in and
of itself, considered a denial of due process and the confession
was admitted since it was voluntary.5 To rule otherwise, the
Court said, "would effectively preclude police questioning, fair as
well as unfair-until the accused was afforded opportunity to call
his attorney." 6
1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. This right applied to federal proceedings and
to state prosecutions involving capital offenses. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
2 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
3 The fourteenth amendment prohibits use of coerced confessions in state
prosecutions. E.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Denial of counsel, however, was only one salient factor in determining
whether an accused's confession was coerced and the conviction based thereon
violative of the right to due process. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532 (1897); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
4 The Court felt that other factors to be considered were, for example,
the length of the interrogation and the conditions under which it took place.
Crooker v. California, supra note 2, at 439, quoting the essential test relied
upon in Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
Crooker v. California, supra note 2, at 439-40.6 1d. at 441. This ruling was predicated on Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 473 (1942), where it was said that "while want of counsel in a particular
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The abject appreciation of the necessity for police interro-
gations, so apparent in Crooker, was conspicuously absent in
Escobedo v. United States.7 There, on somewhat similar facts,
the Court held that the defendant must be accorded the right
to counsel the moment the process becomes accusatory 8 The
Escobedo Court, stressing the defects of police interrogation as a
method of law enforcement, felt that a system based on such
interrogation was undesirable.9 In Escobedo, the defendant had
been arrested and was questioned without being advised of his
right to remain silent. His repeated requests to confer with his
attorney, who was waiting in an adjoining room, were denied,
and he was finally duped into making inculpatory admissions, which
formed the basis for his conviction. The Court reversed this
conviction, holding that
where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the sus-
pect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process
of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with
his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied
"the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment" . . . and. . . no statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.10
While Escobedo apparently established an objective standard,11
confusion arises because the facts of the case were stated in its
case may result in a conviction lacking in . . . fundamental fairness, we
cannot say that the [Fourteenth] Amendment embodies an inexorable command
that no trial for any offense . . . can be fairly conducted and justice accorded
a defendant who is not represented by counsel."7378 U.S. 478 (1964).
S1d. at 492. Prior to Escobedo the Supreme Court eliminated the
fundamental fairness test at the trial level, and held the sixth amendment
applicable to the states, thus making effective appointment of counsel
mandatory in all criminal proceedings. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335(1963). Although the original rule was that counsel must be appointed
sufficiently in advance of trial to adequately prepare a defense (Powell v.
Alabama, supra note 1, at 59), later cases have apparently extended the
right to the arraignment proceeding (Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961)), and the preliminary hearing (White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59(1963)). Gideon provided what might be called a "horizontal" extension
of the right to all criminal cases, while the other cases mentioned extended
the right "vertically" within a particular prosecution.
0 Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1964).
10 Id. at 490-91. (Emphasis added.) See also Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964), which holds that post-indictment statements made in
the absence of counsel are inadmissible.
11 See Note, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 111, 139 (1965).
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holding. Unfortunately, most state courts have been unable to
discern which one, if any, of the enumerated factors was con-
trolling. 2 The scope and purpose of this note will be limited
to an exploration of the effect of Escobedo on the New York
courts as exemplified by the interpretation of several significant
recent cases which purport to enunciate principles attributable
to Escobedo.
Recent New York Cases
The problems created by the joinder of facts in the Escobedo
holding are apparent in recent New York cases, wherein determina-
tions have been based upon fine factual distinctions. Thus, while
one appellate division department ruled a confession inadmissible
where the accused had requested and was denied 13 permission to
see his family, 14 a Court of Appeals case held that the denial of a
father's request to see his accused son was "not in and of itself"
a sufficient basis for excluding the son's confession. 5
The appellate division ruling was based on the fact that it was
the accused who requested aid. The court, in denying any dis-
tinction between a request for a conference with an attorney or
with a member of the family, complied with the underlying
rationale of the Escobedo decision, i.e., that the social interest in
protecting the individual exceeds the social interest in criminal
law enforcement.
Many persons accused of crime are not wise enough, without suggestion,
to ask to see a lawyer, or are so impecunious that they believe they can-
not obtain one without outside aid; and the request of such a person to
see his family may be his way of seeking legal assistance. But even if
he does not rationalize his reasons for asking for his family, we must
assume that he makes such request in order to obtain help; and he is
entitled to have the benefit of their advice and aid, which may include
retention of counsel for him.' 6
The necessity for aid emphasized here was ignored by the Court
of Appeals when it considered the second case mentioned, that is,
where the father's request for a conference was denied. A con-
12 Compare People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rep. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), wvith
People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
13 The denial seemingly need not be explicit. One case held that merely
ignoring the defendant's inquiry as to whether he might remain silent until
he obtained counsel was a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 175 N.E2d 451, 216 N.Y.S2d 79 (1961).
14 People v. Taylor, 22 App. Div. 2d 524, 256 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1st Dep't
1965).
15 People v. Hocking, 15 N.Y.2d 973, 207 N.E.2d 529, 259 N.Y.S.2d 859(1965).
16 People v. Taylor, supra note 14, at 525-26, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
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ference here might well have resulted in the employment of, or
request for, an attorney. The defendant was as helpless in this
case as where the accused had requested a conference with his
family. Since the purpose of a request of this nature is to
seek or provide aid for the accused individual, the origin of the
request should be of no consequence. By a parity of reasoning,
the appellate division rationale should have been applied to the
Court of Appeals decision. Instead, a "totality of circumstances"
test was applied, and the case was remanded for a determination
of the voluntariness of the confession .' This was seemingly in-
correct, since the Court apparently utilized "Crooker reasoning"
in a case within the Escobedo ambit. The Crooker "totality of
circumstances" test, wherein denial of counsel is only one factor
of many, is no longer the issue.' Under Escobedo there is a
self-sustaining right to counsel. A violation of this right, without
reference to any other circumstance, prohibits admission of a
confession subsequently obtained.
The landmark New York case excluding statements made by
the accused after the denial of a request for counsel is People v.
Donovan.9  This decision presaged Escobedo and was cited with
approval by the Supreme Court.20 The Donovan rule, making
the right to counsel applicable at the interrogation stage, has been
restrictively applied in People v. Gunner,21 a recent New York
Court of Appeals case. In order to prevent expansion 2 of the
rule, the Court in Gunner stated that where there is no request
the accused need not be made aware of his right to counsel and
to remain silent.23 In effect, the Court held that there is no duty
on the police to apprise the defendant of his rights,2' even though
17 People v. Hocking, supra note 15.
18 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 9, at 490-91. Denial of counsel was a
factor on the issue of voluntariness under prior cases, e.g., Watts v. Indiana,
supra note 3.
'9 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). The
Donovan decision was the culmination of other New York cases extending
the right to counsel. E.g., People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d
825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960) (absence of counsel at post-arraignment question-
ing in capital case held a denial of due process); People v. Waterman,
9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S2d 70 (1961) (post-indictment
statements in a non-capital case excluded where the accused was not advised
of his rights); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962) (statements made after arraignment or indictment
excluded in felony case where there was an absence of counsel).
20 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 9, at 486.2 1 Supra note 12.
22 Cf. People v. Dorado, supra note 12.
23 People v. Gunner, supra note 12. It should be noted, however, that
the Court, although limiting the right in one respect, actually extended it in
another, by holding an attorney's request equivalent to that of the accused.
24 The question of whether there was such a duty was initially posed-
and left unanswered in People v. Stanley, 15 N.Y.2d 30, 203 N.E.2d 475,
255 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1964).
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he is the "target of the investigation and stands in the shoes of
an accused." 25 Prima facie, these statements are contrary to
Escobedo, where it was said:
when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our
adversary system begins to operate, and under the circumstances here,
the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.26
It would appear then, that the purported limitation of the
Donovan rule enunciated in Gunner partially negates the right
to counsel as it is prescribed by the Supreme Court.
To recapitulate, the law in New York seems well established
that an accused's confession is inadmissible if either he or his
attorney has requested a conference, and there has been a denial.
It is also inadmissible where permission to see his family is refused.
An accused's rights are held not violated if his family's request to
confer with him is denied, or if he himself makes no request and the
police do not apprise him of his rights.
The Necessity for a Request
The policy considerations involving the right to counsel were
recognized early in New York and were restated in the Donovan
opinion, where the Court explained that the essential problem is
one of achieving "a balance between the competing interests of
society in the protection of cherished individual rights . . . and in
effective law enforcement and investigation of crime." 27 The
Donovan decision embodied the spirit of many prior Supreme Court
cases such as Powell v. Alabama7,8 where it was recognized that
the accused "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him." 29 This was not a mere factual
observation, but a constitutional principle. The Court considered
the right involved "of such a character that it could not be denied
without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." 30
This attack on a summary type justice, which is inattentive to the
25 People v. Gunner, supra note 12, at 233, 205 N.E.2d at 856, 257 N.Y.S.2d
at 929.
26 Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 9, at 492.
2 7 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 150, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841, 842 (1963).
28287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Brai v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897), where the confession doctrine was confused with the privilege against
self-incrimination.
29 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
O Id. at 67.
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needs of the accused, was waged successfully on many fronts.3 '
It culminated in Escobedo, where the Court condemned police
practices designed to prey on the individual who is unaware of his
rights.
It appears that the Supreme Court now considers the police
to be in a superior position if the individual under interrogation is
unaware that he has the right to remain silent. This position
is obviously maintained and the attendant ability to elicit a con-
fession is improved, if the police are under "no duty" to apprise
the accused of this right. The Escobedo Court attacked this
imbalance in favor of law enforcement and stated that "no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes
to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights." 32
Although the basis of decision in recent New York cases has
not been explicity stated as being the felt necessity to preserve
"prime confession time" (usually the period between arrest and
arraignment), this policy has, no doubt, been the subject of
serious consideration.3 3  Its real, if only implicit, effect has been to
narrow the operative area of right to counsel, and to accord
police interrogation a greater latitude. Escobedo, on the other
hand, strikes at the very heart of any decision based on preserving
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement at the expense
of the individual. "No system worth preserving should have to
fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he
will become aware of and exercise these [constitutional] rights.
If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness
of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong
with that system." 84 In view of this statement, it would seem
that a "no duty" philosophy, such as that espoused in Gunner,
signifies a retreat, rather than an advancement over prior law.35
The Escobedo Court, noting the high percentage of con-
fessions obtained at the interrogation stage, concluded that where
31 E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
32 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
33 See, e.g., People v. Gunner, supra note 12 (dissenting opinion).
34 Supra note 32.
35 The deficiencies inherent in the Gunner decision were recognized in a
recent California case (People v. Dorado, supra note 12, at 177-78, 398 P.2d
at 369-70), wherein it was stated: "[T]he imposition of the requirement for
the request would discriminate against the defendant who does not know his
rights. The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant
who most needs counsel. We cannot penalize -a defendant who, not under-
standing his constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and by
such failure demonstrates his helplessness. To require the request would
be to favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously
prompted him to make it."
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the productivity of police investigation is increased, so also is the
necessity for counsel.36  "The fact that many confessions are
obtained during this period points up its critical nature as a stage
when legal aid and advice are sorely needed." 37 To avoid any
imbalance in favor of the police rather than the individual, the
Court announced that "our constitution unlike some others strikes
the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised
by his lawyer of his privilege against self incrimination."38 But
how can the accused be advised by his lawyer, if he is unaware
of his right to counsel? The individual can only take proper
advantage of his right to remain silent, if he is first advised
and then avails himself of his right to counsel. If the accused
declines counsel, it would appear that the separate right to remain
silent persists,3 9 and that the police must apprise him of this right
before attempting to elicit a confession. 40
Mallory in the State Courts
In Mallory v. United States,41 the Supreme Court prescribed
a formula for restricting violations of the accused's rights in the
federal system. The decision severely limited the operable area
of federal law enforcement by holding that confessions elicited in
violation of the federal "early arraignment" statute 42 are in-
admissible. This ruling restricted enforcement procedures and
thereby minimized incommunicado interrogation. The federal
process, as defined by the Mallory Court, requires that police
effectuate an arrest only on probable cause. The next prescribed
step is arraignment before a judicial officer as quickly as possible,
so that the accused may be advised of his rights and so that
36 Supra note 32, at 488.
37Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 "After he has been arrested, a suspect may not be interrogated unless
he has been fully and effectively warned of his right to remain silent."
Spanogle, Immmunly Through Confession?, 18 VAND. L. REV. 37, 44-45
(1964).
40 This view is predicated on the fact that the Escobedo Court distinguished
Crooker on the ground that the defendant there had been "explicitly advised
by the police of his constitutional right to remain silent. . . ." The
Escobedo Court regarded this factor as a "critical circums"ance" separating
the two cases. Supra note 32, at 491-92. However, it seems reasonable
to assume that the requirement to advise excludes so-called "threshold"
confessions, ie., made before or at the moment the process becomes ac-
cusatory, where police have not had an opportunity to advise the accused.
See Note, 19 RurTGRs L. RIEv. 140, 148-49 (1965).
41354 U.S. 449 (1957).
42 FFD. R. Cans. P. 5(a). To the same effect, see N.Y. CODE CRmI.
PRoc. § 165; N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1844.
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probable cause may be determined. The Mallory opinion also
added a caveat to this procedure:
the arrested person may, of course, be "booked" by the police. But he
is not to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process
of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging
statements to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt.43
The Mallory decision was not originally applicable to the states,
since it was grounded on the Supreme Court's supervisory power
over the federal system. However, it apparently now applies to
the states in spirit, if not as a mandatory rule. Escobedo seemingly
attempted to raise the "supervisory" Mallory decision to the
status of a constitutional principle applicable to the states. Surely,
the Mallory decision was expressed in terms akin to those em-
ployed in Escobedo. The Mallory intention to restrict police
investigatory power was the Escobedo "cause." And the procedure
prescribed in Escobedo, one which affords the accused an op-
portunity to utilize his rights, was within the Mallory design. Un-
fortunately, Escobedo has apparently failed to accomplish its end
because of its indiscriminate enumeration of the circumstances of
the case. Its standard has faltered at the precise moment when
courts are most in need of guides to decision-that is, when there
is a slight variation in circumstances.
Although it may well be argued that the line purportedly drawn
in Escobedo is ambiguous and wavering, nevertheless, decisions such
as Gunner are clearly without the general philosophy expressed by
the Supreme Court. The basic proposition espoused in Escobedo,
that the accused must be accorded the right to counsel whether or
not there is a request, is not easily misunderstood.
The right to counsel is seriously hampered in operation and
effect where it is made dependent upon a request. The Supreme
Court, in a pre-Escobedo decision, stated: "[W] here the assistance
of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished
counsel does not depend on a request." 44 Moreover, any failure
on the part of the accused to make a request cannot be considered
an implied waiver of his rights. Waiver has been defined as
"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege." 4 5  Only when the accused is aware of his rights
can he effectively waive them, since an "intentional relinquish-
ment" imports intellectual awareness of what his action involves.
48Mallory v. United States, supra note 41, at 454.
44 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
4
-Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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Conclusion
The joinder of facts in the Escobedo holding has wrought
serious controversy over its meaning and effect. It is submitted,
however, that the path hewn by the New York courts is at best
tangential. This position is substantiated by the general tenor of
the Escobedo opinion, and by the recent history of the Supreme
Court which evidences a marked tendency toward proscribing prior
law enforcement practices in favor of a countervailing interest
in the protection of the individual.
Certainly, the underlying problem, that is, a denial of sub-
stantial justice to one accused of crime, remains the same whether
there is a request for counsel or not. Vital individual rights cannot
be mechanically denied, and the formalistic distinctions made in
New York regarding the origin of a request are not even logically
satisfying. When the accused is unaware, and is not advised
of his rights, he is prone to the loss of defenses and privileges.
It is this occurrence which truly makes the trial no more than
an appeal from the interrogation, and this is exactly what the
Escobedo Court attempted to eliminate. In fact, Escobedo con-
cluded that a system of law enforcement which depends for success
upon obtaining a confession will be less reliable and more subject
to abuse than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation.
ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING-THE INADEQUATE PROTECTION
OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATION
Introduction
Electronic eavesdropping devices, the "tools" I which enable
one to surreptitiously monitor and record a private conversation
not conducted within his physical presence,2 have become a problem
' For a description of directional microphones, tape recorders, induction
coils, and various other electronic eavesdropping devices currently available
see DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, TE EAVESDROPPERS 305-81 (1959).
For a discussion of the use of miniature microphones and radio transmitters,
and the possibility of eavesdropping by laser light, see Time, March 6, 1964,
pp. 55-56.2 Electronic eavesdropping may be classified into three general categories:
(1) wiretapping, which may be accomplished by means of a physical
connection to the tapped line, or by means of an induction coil,
in which case no direct connection is necessary;
1965 ]
